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Peck: Viable Protection Mechanisms for Lenders Against Hazardous Waste

VIABLE PROTECTION MECHANISMS FOR
LENDERS AGAINST HAZARDOUS WASTE
LIABILITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the wake of recent legislative changes in environmental law
regarding hazardous waste contamination,1 new liabilities and business risks have developed for lenders who secure loans with real
property. Two situations presently exist in which lenders must be
particularly concerned with the potential liability for cleanup costs
at their borrowers' hazardous waste sites. First, the lender may be
held liable as an "owner or operator" of a facility if the lender becomes too closely involved in the management of the company,2 especially if the lender may be characterized as going beyond the control necessary to protect its financial interests. 3 Second, the lender
may also be held liable as an "owner or operator" if the lender forecloses on the property and does not re-sell it as soon as possible.4
Moreover, the scope of the affirmative defense available to the "innocent landowner" has been narrowed since the original legislation,5
thereby creating an environment where courts may begin to hold
lenders liable when the activity of the lender is more closely related
to the financial interest in the borrower.
A third concern for lenders is when a borrower files for bankruptcy. The Supreme Court has ruled that a property may not be
abandoned in bankruptcy even if it is worth less than the cost of the
cleanup. 6 In addition, the cost of cleanup may be considered an ad1. The most notable legislation is the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see also infra note 56 (discussing the definition of "owner" under CERCLA).
3. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
5. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982); see infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text (discussing statutory defenses to CERCLA). See generally D.J. HAYES & C.B.
MACKERRON, SUPERFUND II: A NEW MANDATE 29 (BNA Special Rep. 1987) (discussing the
1986 Amendments and its effect on business).
6. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
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ministrative expense of the estate, thereby giving cleanup expenses
incurred by the government priority over other creditors.
Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to anticipate that lenders will suspend financing those commercial transactions which may incur environmental hazards despite the threat of potential lender liability for
cleanup. 8 Instead, lenders must develop measures to minimize their
risks and become more aware of environmental concerns in order to
identify and alleviate potential liability.9
This Note examines the potential liability to lenders for hazardous waste disposal by their borrowers as well as the methods lenders
may utilize to protect their investments by minimizing their risk of
liability. These methods include: (1) obtaining environmental audits
and reports, 10 (2) procuring pollution liability insurance," (3) including indemnification clauses and warranties in security instruments,'12 and (4) requiring affirmative title insurance against hazardous waste.' 3
II.

SCOPE OF LIABILITY

A. Statutory Overview
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) x4 in response
to the growing problem of environmental harm caused by improper
In Midlantic Nat'l Bank, the Supreme Court held that property could not be abandoned in a
bankruptcy proceeding when a lien existed for the cleanup of hazardous waste on the premises.
Id. at 505. The Court emphasized its holding applied even if the cost of cleanup exceeds the
value of the property Id. at 497; see also id. § 506 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (ascertaining
secured status under the Bankruptcy Code); id. § 507(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (determining priority in a bankruptcy proceeding). See generally sources cited infra note 85 (discussing
the impact of hazardous waste litigation upon bankruptcy proceedings).
7. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
8. See Banks Increasingly at Risk from Liability for Pollution Problems, Banking
Official Says, 17 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 1624 (Jan. 23, 1987) (noting that avoiding potential
hazardous waste sites "would mean in large measure you would have to stay out of everything
involving real estate."); infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of
lenders refusing to loan to businesses with high risk of CERCLA liability).
9. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (discussing the need to develop measures to minimize risk).
10. See infra notes 91-149 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 150-89 and accompanying text.
12, See infra notes 190-96 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 197-204 and accompanying text.
14. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
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disposal of hazardous waste." CERCLA was designed to supplement
existing regulations dealing with hazardous waste, and to provide a
means of enforcing and supervising the cleanup of hazardous waste
contamination."6
CERCLA established regulations" and funds18 for the cleanup
H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
& ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6120; see also Burcat, Environmental Liability of Creditors: Open Season on Banks, Creditors,and Other Deep Pockets, 103 BANKING L. J. 509, 511
(1986) (discussing the evolution of CERCLA); Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982) (discussing in detail the congressional hearings, analyzing the
committee reports and rendering insight concerning the views of members of the committees);
Zazzali & Grad, Hazardous Wastes: New Rights and Remedies?-The Report and Recommendations of the Superfund Study Group, 13 SETON HALL L. REv. 446 (1983) (summarizing the findings and recommendations of the Superfund Study Group which was chartered by
Congress).
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) determines what substances are considered
hazardous. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1982
& Supp. IV 1986). RCRA empowers the EPA with the authority to regulate potentially hazardous substances and provides guidelines for the EPA to follow. Id. § 6911 (1982); see also
infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (discussing RCRA and its relationship to
CERCLA).
16. See Burcat, supra note 15, at 511. CERCLA was enacted, in part, as a mechanism
for immediate response by the government concerning hazardous waste sites. Id. The new
legislation supplemented existing federal laws and regulations regarding hazardous materials
established under RCRA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. IV. 1986).
17. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (Supp. IV. 1986) (regulating cleanup standards and
procedures); id. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1982) (establishing cleanup liability for "all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the [Federal] [G]overnment or a state ... not inconsistent with the national contingency plan.").
18. See Hall & Sullivan, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
15.

CODE CONG.

Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund), in

GOVERNMENT INSTITUTES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

415, 416 (7th ed. 1983). A fund was established by CERCLA to pay for the
immediate cleanup of the premises. Id. CERCLA is also known as "Superfund" legislation.
Some states have also initiated legislation which allows the state to cleanup the property and
then recover the costs from parties determined to be liable. See, e.g., New Jersey Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act (ECRA), 1983 N.J. Laws ch. 330. A "superlien" is established
to ensure payment of the cleanup by the liable party to the state and in some states, such as
New Jersey, this lien is given priority over secured creditors. See id.
"The key purpose of [the] Superfund is to establish a mechanism of response for the
immediate cleanup of hazardous waste contamination from an accidental spill or from chronic
environmental damage such as is associated with an abandoned hazardous waste disposal site."
Hall & Sullivan, supra, at 416. The EPA is delegated responsibility from the President to
cleanup hazardous waste contamination and is therefore able to use such funds to cleanup the
waste site, and is also authorized to initiate lawsuits in order to have liable parties ultimately
bear the cost of the cleanup. Exec. Order No. 12,316, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,237 (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. §300).
Financing of the fund comes from several sources:
The Hazardous Substance Response Fund ... receives 87.5 % of its revenue from
petroleum and chemical feedstock taxes, with the remaining 12.5% coming from
HANDBOOK
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of hazardous waste and attempted to develop expedient emergency
abatement procedures in order to respond to the presence of hazardous waste in or at affected sites, even when the site has been abandoned."9 The purpose of this legislation was to facilitate the cleanup
of hazardous waste disposal sites regardless of the legitimacy or illegality of the dumping.20 Since the cleanup costs of hazardous waste
sites are astounding, 21 the financial burden for the cleanup costs is
imposed on parties responsible for creating the harmful condition.22
Treasury appropriations. The taxes, imposed as of 1 April 1981 will remain in effect
until 30 September 1985 or until $1.38 billion has accumulated in the Response
Fund. This fund is available to respond to releases from any active, and most inactive, sites.
Hall & Sullivan, supra, at 416. A second fund, the Post-Closure Fund, provides money for the
cleanup of sites which have been closed. Id. The revenue for the Post-Closure Fund comes
from taxes levied on all hazardous waste and is collected at waste disposal facilities. Id. The
tax remains in effect until $200 million has accumulated in the fund. Id.
19. Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1276 (D. Del. 1987),
affid, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir.1988) (providing a legislative overview of CERCLA). Chief Judge
Schwarts explained that "[m]any of these sites had been abandoned by any party who could
be held accountable for the cleanup. Wherever possible, however, CERCLA places the ultimate financial burden of toxic waste cleanup on those responsible for creating the harmful
conditions." Id.; cf. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F.Supp.
823 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (holding that although under CERCLA parties are liable for response
costs of contaminated property which has been abandoned, the legislation is not retroactive
with regard to non-negligent off-site transporters and generators), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
810 F.2d 726, 734-37 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
20. Hall & Sullivan, supra note 18, at 416; see also supra note 15 (discussing the legislative history of CERCLA).
21. See Wells, Toxic-Waste Disposal Firms Enter High-Technology Era, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 10, 1986, at A31, col. 1. It is estimated that the in the next five years the private and
public sector will spend from $13 billion to $20 billion annually on hazardous waste disposal
and cleanup. Id. An EPA study estimated it would cost $7.2 million to cleanup each hazardous
waste site. 49 Fed. Reg. 40,320, 40,325 (1984).
22. CERCLA § 107(a) provides the following:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses
set forth in subsection (b) of the section ... [accountable parties] shall be liable
for(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State not inconsistent with the national contingency plan; (B) any
other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the
national contingency plan; and (C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such release.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982); see also Artesian Water Co., 659 F. Supp. at 1277 (noting that
"CERCLA provides that the federal government, state governments and private parties may
sue those responsible for the generation, transportation, or disposal of hazardous substances.").
Courts have broadly construed § 107(a) and have imposed strict liability on potential
defendants. For example, the Second Circuit held that a current owner of property who had
knowledge of its condition may be responsible for response costs without regard to causation
under § 107(a)(1), even though that party had not owned the site at the time of the dumping
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Liability under CERCLA23 is imposed on four classes of defendants: (1) present "owners or operators" of the hazardous waste
site; (2) "owners or operators" of the site at the time of the waste
disposal; (3) hazardous waste generators who arrange for disposal at
the contaminated site; and (4) transporters of the hazardous material for disposal at the site.24 Strict liability has uniformly been construed when establishing a responsible party under section 107(a) of
CERCLA.2 5 Liability, however, is subject to defenses under section
107(b) for release of hazardous material caused solely by an act of
God, an act of war or an act or omission of a third party unrelated
and had not "operated" the facility. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044-45
(2d Cir. 1985); accord United States v. Cauffman, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,161,
20,162 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 1984) (holding that causation was not required to establish liability
of property owner or operator). See generally Levitas & Hughes, Hazardous Waste Issues in
Real Estate Transactions, 38 MERCER L. REv. 581, 592 (1987) (discussing the standards of
liability under CERCLA).
23. CERCLA provides that responsible parties are liable for response costs. 42 U.S.C. §
9607(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Response costs are costs of either removal actions or
remedial actions. See id. § 9601(25) (1982 & Supp. IV. 1986).
24. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). CERCLA § 107(a) defines the
classes of liable parties as:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel ... or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, ... of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any
other party or entity, at any facility owned or operated by another party or entity
and containing hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by such person, from which there is
a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance.
Id. For further explanation and definition of "owner and operator," see infra notes 52-54 and
accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1042; United States v. Maryland Bank &
Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984), affld in part,rev'd in part, 810
F.2d 726 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). In Shore Realty Corp., the judiciary's
broad interpretation of CERCLA liability is clearly illustrated:
It is quite clear that if the current owner of a site could avoid liability merely by
having purchased the site after the chemical dumping had ceased, waste sites certainly would be sold, following the cessation of dumping, to new owners who could
avoid the liability otherwise required by CERCLA. Congress had well in mind that
persons who dump or store hazardous waste sometimes cannot be located or may be
deceased or judgment-proof. We will not interpret section [107(a)] in any way that
apparently frustrates the statute's goals, in the absence of a specific congressional
intention otherwise.
759 F.2d at 1045 (citations omitted).
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to the defendant." If the responsible party27 cannot be located or is
unable to finance the cleanup, the "Superfund" established by CER28
CLA will absorb the cost.
Unfortunately, CERCLA was a poorly worded compromise bill
rushed through Congress in its closing hours due to the urgency of
the problem and intensity of political pressure.2 9 One court, frus26.

CERCLA § 107(b) provides:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person
otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent or the
defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant . . . if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due
care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration
the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and
circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of
any such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such
acts or omissions ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982).
In the 1986 amendments to CERCLA, the term "third party" defense in CERCLA §
107(b)(3) was clarified, making it explicit that there was no liability when a party can show
that the release was caused solely by someone else, and due diligence was taken by the "innocent landowner" to determine the presence of hazardous material. See Pub. L. No. 99-499, §
101(35), 100 Stat. 1613, 1616-1617 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (Supp. IV
1986)); infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text (discussing the changes in the 1986 amendments which affected the use of "third party" defenses).
27. See supra notes 23-24.
28. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Artesian Water Co. v. New
Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (D. Del. 1987) (stating that "[tihe federal government is authorized to use the Superfund to finance governmental response activities, to pay
claims arising from response activities by private parties, and to compensate federal and state
governmental entities for damage caused to natural resources." (citing CERCLA § 111 (a), 42
U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1982))), afj'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988).
29. There were two separate bills which proceeded through the House and the Senate
that dealt with the problem of toxic waste cleanup. The Senate bill contained major last minute alterations to insure that it would pass and the House bill was amended to conform with
the Senate bill. The bill in its final form differed substantially from bills introduced earlier in
the Senate and the House. Alexander, CERCLA 1980-1985: A Research Guide, 13 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 311, 312 (1986). See generally 1980 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119 (reprinting
the legislative history of CERCLA).
Although Congress worked on "Superfund" legislation for three years prior to the enactment of CERCLA, the actual bill has little published legislative history. F. GRAD, TREATISE
ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1 (1981); Grad, supra note 15, at 1. It was put together by a
bipartisan group of senators with some assistance from representatives and then was introduced and passed by the Senate in lieu-of other pending bills on the same issue. Id. On December 3, 1980, "in the closing days of the lame duck session of an outgoing Congress," the
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trated over the original legislation, commented that "numerous important features were deleted during the closing hours of the Congressional session. .

.

. The courts are once again placed in the

undesirable and onerous position of construing inadequately drawn
legislation." 30o
In 1986, the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act
(SARA)31 was enacted as a substantial amendment to CERCLA.3 2
The amendment clarified many points which were unclear in the
original legislation and attempted to increase the sophistication and
effectiveness of the original legislation in light of current problems
posed by hazardous materials.3 3 It is expected that in light of
SARA, there will be a dramatic increase in the number of federal
actions for hazardous waste cleanup.34
Although section 107 was essentially unchanged by the 1986
amendment,3 5 the amendment added newly defined terms to section
bill was considered and enacted with little debate. Id.; cf.supra note 15 (listing sources which
discuss and review the legislative history of CERCLA). See generally Exxon Corp. v. Hunt,
475 U.S. 355, 368-74 (1986) (examining the available legislative history by reviewing CERCLA's predecessors).
30. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 838839 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984), affd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 848 (1987) (citations omitted). Other courts have had similar comments. See, e.g.,
Artesian Water Co., 659 F. Supp. at 1276 (criticizing CERCLA as being "hardly a model of
concise legislative draftsmanship.").
31. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(Supp. IV 1986)).
32. See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 66-125, reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2835, 2848-2901; see also 4 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SL-1 to -71 (1981) (comparing the text of CERCLA before and after the
SARA amendments).
33. H.R. REP.No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 54-56, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2835, 2836-38.
34. Rothenberg, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Loss, in SUPERFUND REPORT:
WHAT DO RESPONSIBLE PARTIES

Do Now? 80 (1986). For further discussion of the affects of

SARA and the changes made to the original legislation, see Hayes & Mackerron, supra note
5, at 3; Mays, Settlements with SARA: A Comprehensive Review of Settlement Procedure
under the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,
HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIGATION AFTER RCRA AND CERCLA AMENDMENTS 1987, at 231,
232-35 (1987).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). One change in SARA is a federal
lien provision. See id. § 9607(1) (Supp. IV 1986). This provision mandates that all costs and
damages assessed to a liable entity under section 107 shall constitute a lien in favor of the
United States. Id. § 9607(a) (1982). The purpose of this additional provision is to ensure that
a landowner who benefits from Superfund dollars does not gain windfall profits from selling
decontaminated property. H.R. REP.No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3038, 3040.
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10136 which helped clarify the vague language of section 107 7 One
important clarification for lenders is the definition of "contractual
relationship."'38 Section 101(35)(A) of SARA39 provides a statutory
exception to subsequent owner liability if the defendant acquires the
facility after the hazardous waste disposal occurred and the defendant at the time of acquisition did not know or have reason to know of
the disposal.4 0 The defendant, however, has an affirmative duty to
inquire into the previous owner's activities in a manner "consistent
36. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (Supp. IV 1986).
37. For example, it was unclear from the language of the original statute what constituted a contractual relationship. The legislative history of CERCLA strongly suggested that
the contractual relationship exception to the third party defense was intended only to apply to
contractors and other types of individuals. See 126 CONG. REc. 24,337 (Sept. 4, 1980) (statement of Rep. Gore); see also supra note 26 (discussing exceptions to CERCLA liability).
Many cases which dealt with the definition of contractual relationships were in the context of
work contractors rather than parties involved in real estate transactions. See, e.g., United
States v, Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 897-98 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (holding that the third party
defense was not applicable because the defendant was in a contractual relationship or an agent
or employee with the transporter who was responsible for the illegal dumping); United States
v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, 21 Envtl. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1577, 1581 (D.S.C.
1984) (holding a landowner liable when there was a contractual relationship with a company
storing contaminated barrels on the property). Nevertheless, one court commented in a footnote that, "[the buyer] appears to have a contractual relationship with the previous owners
that blocks the [third-party] defense. The purchase agreement includes provisions by which
[the buyer] assumed at least some of the environmental liability of the previous owners." New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1048 n.23 (2d Cir. 1985). Although the court
failed to explain whether any contract of sale would prevent third party defenses, it was clear
that the court was expanding the definition to alarming proportions.
38. SARA § 101(35)(A) provides:
The term "contractual relationship", for the purpose of section [107(b)(3)]...
includes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds or other instruments transferring title of possession, unless the real property on which the facility concerned is
located was acquired by the defendant after the disposal or placement of the hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility, and one or more of the circumstances
described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) is also established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not know
and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the
release or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility.
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facility by escheat, or through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through the exercise of eminent domain authority by purchase or condemnation.
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest.
In addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must establish that he has
satisfied the requirements of section [107](b)(3)(a) and (b) ....
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
39. Id.
40. Id. § 9601(35)(A)(i).
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with good commercial or customary practice" to minimize liability.4
This provision affects the affirmative "third party" defenses available
under CERCLA a and over time the courts will have to determine
what constitutes "good commercial or customary practice". 43 It is
clear, however, that in order to take advantage of the third party
defense, there must be affirmative inquiry into whether there is hazardous material at the property site."
Both CERCLA and SARA interrelate with other environmental

regulations. The most closely related federal legislation is the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which was enacted
in 1976.45 RCRA has been called "Cradle to Grave" legislation be41. Id. § 9601(35)(B). Section 9601(35)(B) describes the duty of inquiry for potential
landowners as follows:
(B) To establish that the defendant had no reason to know ... the defendant must
have undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous
ownership and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or customary
practice in an effort to minimize liability. For purposes of the preceding sentence
the court shall take into account any specialized knowledge or experience on the
part of the defendant, the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the
property if uncontaminated, commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the property, the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at the property, and the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection.
Id.
42. Id. § 9607(b).
43. Id.
44. Id. § 9607(b)(3). In order for the statute to apply, the third party must (a) exercise
"due care ... in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) ... [take] precautions
against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions." Id. As one commentator noted:
[A] purchaser that averts its eyes from contamination ... is unlikely to be able to
invoke the [third-party] defense successfully.
In fact, a buyer must take affirmative steps to protect itself, and it is in the
lender's interest to assure that a borrower takes such steps when purchasing property that may be contaminated ...
Whether such inquiry is appropriate depends on the buyer's specialized knowledge or experience, commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about
the property, and the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection.
The relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if uncontaminated is important, too.
Brown, Superfunds and Superliens: Super Problems for Secured Lenders, Toxics L. REP.,

Mar. 16, 1988, reprinted in

PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS ON BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 1988: REAL PROPERTY TRANSFERS AND MERGERS
AND ACQUISITIONS 445, 451 (1988) (citations omitted) [hereinafter IMPACT ON BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS: 1988]; see also Comment, The Liability of FinancialInstitutionsfor Hazard-

ous Waste Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 WIs. L. REV. 139, 156-159 (authored by
Patricia L. Quentel) (analyzing standards of due care and discussing the applicability of third
party defenses available under SARA § 107(b)(3)).
45. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
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cause it was designed to oversee the use, transportation and disposal
of hazardous material for the duration of the potential risk to persons or the environment by the material.46 Another relevant statute
47
is the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendment of 1984 (HSWA),
48
which extended the power delegated to the EPA under RCRA.
B. Potential Lender Liability
Although lenders are not explicitly named in CERCLA as potential defendants, liability for the cleanup of hazardous waste disposal on property where the lender has a security interest may nonetheless occur. For example, a party with a contractual relationship with
the party directly responsible for the disposal may be held liable
under CERCLA. 49 The rationale for this imposition of liability is
that a party with a contractual relationship is presumed to have
known or should have known 50 of the activities causing the pollution
6901-6991 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). RCRA authorized the EPA to issue and enforce regulations regarding hazardous waste. Id. "A fundamental premise of the statute is that human
health and the environment will be best protected by careful management of the transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste, in accordance with standards developed under the Act." 45 Fed. Reg. 12746 (Feb. 26, 1980). The Act directs the EPA to identify
hazardous waste, issue standards for generators of hazardous waste and for transportation of
hazardous material, and issue regulations requiring permits for those engaging in such activities. 1 G. DOMINGUEZ & K. BERTLETT, HAZARDOUS
ICS AND Toxic SUBSTANCES 80 (1986).

WASTE MANAGEMENT:

THE

LAW OF

Tox-

46. G. DOMINGUEZ & K. BERTLETr, supra note 45, at 51-78. See generally R. FORTUNA
& D. LENNETT, HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION: THE NEW ERA (1987) (analyzing and
describing federal hazardous waste regulations under RCRA and the Hazardous and Solid
Waste Amendments of 1984).
47. Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991
(Supp. IV 1986)).
48. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (Supp. IV 1986). The amendment was a means used
by Congress to force the EPA to develop tougher standards and to close up loopholes which
existed in the original legislation. See G. DOMINGUEZ & K. BERTLETT, supra note 45, at 75-

77.
49. This liability is a rebuttable presumption under CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. §
9607(b)(3) (1982). A defendant held liable based upon the existence of a contractual relationship with the party directly responsible for the hazardous waste disposal must establish that he
did not know nor had any reason to know of the disposal in order to take advantage of the
"third party" defense. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (Supp. IV 1986); see supra notes 36-44 and
accompanying text. This means that the defendant has an affirmative duty of inquiry, in a
commercially sound manner, concerning the potential for hazardous waste contamination on
the premises. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (Supp. IV 1986). This defense, therefore, requires that
the prospective purchaser fully investigate the property prior to purchasing the premises because ignorance may not be a viable defense without some attempt to protect oneself. Klotz &
Siakotos, Lender Liability under Federal and State Environmental Law: Of Deep Pockets,
Debt Defeat and Deadbeats, 92 COMM. L.J. 275, 286 (1988).
50. Congress has taken the position that "[tlhose engaged in commercial transactions
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and therefore had the capacity to prevent hazardous disposal."
Curiously, a lender may, under certain situations, be considered
an "owner or operator"52 of the property even without having title or
taking possession of the premises.5 One court interpreted an owner
or operator for the purposes of CERCLA as "a person who owns
interest in a facility and is actively participating in its manageshould .. be held to a higher standard than those who are engaged in private residential
transactions." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3275, 3280.
51. Cf. United States v. Mobil Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 1972) (granting
immunity to an oil company that owned a facility where a malfunction had occurred, even
though the corporation was the "person in charge" of the facility). In interpreting the meaning
of "owner and operator" in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1161 (b)(4)
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986), the court in Mobil stated that "It]he owner-operator has power to
direct the activities of persons who control the mechanisms causing the pollution. The owneroperator has the capacity to prevent and abate damage." Id.
It is clear that similar definitions of owner and operator are being formulated under CERCLA to impose liability. The third party defense may be very difficult for a lender to prove
because of the necessity of showing that there was no constructive notice of the dumping activity for a party with a contractual relationship. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
One commentator noted that the definition of a contractual relationship in SARA, see infra
note 56 (defining "owner and operator"), changes the focus and the threshold standard in
determining the applicability of a "third-party" defense. Comment, The Impact of the 1986
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act on the Commercial Lending Industry: A
Critical Assessment, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 879, 898 (1987) (authored by Steven B. Bass)
(stating that "[u]nder section 101(35), the focus of the judicial inquiry shifts from an assessment of causation to an assessment of actual and constructive notice." (footnotes omitted)).
52. "Inthe case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, [an owner or operator is]
any person owning or operating such facility." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii) (1982). This definition remained unchanged in SARA, and therefore, might have opened the doors for further
expansion of the terms "owner" or "operator" by the courts.
53. See infra notes 54-77 and accompanying text (discussing situations where a lender
could be held liable for the actions of their borrower); see also United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 846-850 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (expanding the
definition of "owner and operator" to include all past owners and operators and suggesting
potential liability under the statute to virtually any party intrinsically involved in the workings
of the facility), affd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848
(1987). One author has suggested:
There is no limit under the statute to how far back in time an act by a former
generator, owner, operator, or transporter which contributes to a current release or
threat may have occurred in order for him to be liable. Similarly there is no guarantee that the treatment or disposal ... today will not render the generator, owner, or
operator liable many years in the future for extensive cleanup and remedial costs.
Hall, The Problem of Unended Liability for Hazardous Waste Management, 38 Bus. LAW.
593, 603 (1983).
The potential for unlimited liability should be particularly troubling to lenders because,
under certain circumstances, they may be held liable retroactively for lending practices of
loans already made. In addition, the value of the collateral may be greatly reduced for outstanding loans because of a prior owner's mishandling of hazardous material.
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ment. .. .
Lenders should be especially concerned where they
have been significantly involved in the activities of the business.55 As
a general rule, the statutory "security interest" exception protects a
lender from liability when merely holding the indicia of ownership as
a method of protecting their security interest. 56 If, however, the secured party is involved in managerial functions of the company, it
may not be afforded the protection of the exception.57 It has been
left to the courts to determine where to draw the line on the amount
of managerial intervention a secured party may be allowed without
giving rise to potential CERCLA liability.58
The most alarming interpretation of potential lender liability for
hazardous waste was in United States v. Mirabile.59 In Mirabile, the
54. Northeastern Pharmaceutical& Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. at 848.
55. See infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982). This section provides:
"[O]wner or operator" means . . .(ii) in the case of an onshore facility or and
offshore facility, any person owning or operating such facility ....Such term does

not include a person, who, without participatingin the management of a vessel or
facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the
vessel or facility.
Id. (emphasis added).
The legislative history of the original CERCLA limited the definition of "owner" so as
not to include someone "possessing indicia of ownership (such as a financial institution) who,
without participating in the management or operation of a vessel or facility, hold title either in
order to secure a loan or in connection with a lease financing arrangement under the appropriate banking laws, rules or regulations." H.R. REP No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 36,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6151, 6181. The House Report
presented an example of what situation would not lead to a financial institution being considered an 'owner' under CERCLA. The report stated that "a financial institution which held
title primarily to secure a loan but also received tax benefits as the result of holding title would
not be an 'owner' as long as it did not participate in the management or operation of the vessel
or facility." Id.
An example of how this statute works to protect the secured party is In re T.P. Long
Chem., Inc., 45 Bankr. 278, 288-89 (N.D. Ohio 1985). T.P. Long held that a lender was not
liable for the cleanup costs incurred by the EPA because the bank, BancOhio, held only a
perfected security interest in the premises and clearly did not engage in managerial functions
of the business. Id. at 288-89. The court also stated in dicta that even if BancOhio had foreclosed on the property, they would still not be held liable and would fall under the secured
party exception of CERCLA § 101(20)(A). Id.
57. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text (explaining that a high level of involvement by a lender in the management of their borrowers may lead to CERCLA liability).
58. Compare T.P Long, 45 Bankr. at 289 (holding that even if the secured creditor had
taken title to the premises, there would not be liability because the lender had not played any
managerial role in the company) with United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) (holding in part that a bank may have liability for
hazardous waste cleanup because it played some managerial role). For further discussion of
Mirabile, see infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
59. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
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bank moved for summary judgment based on the secured party exception to CERCLA.6 0 The court denied the motion, holding that
the bank was potentially liable for hazardous waste cleanup under
CERCLA based on the integral role the bank played in the management of its borrower. 1 The court explained that liability would be
imposed where the lender's participation extends to the "nuts-andbolts, day-to-day production" 62 of the borrower and where the lender
participates in more than mere financial aspects of operations.6 3 Accordingly, a lender involved in the management of its borrower's
business, to an extent greater than that which is essential to monitor
the financial condition of the company, could potentially be faced
with CERCLA liability. 4 This is disturbing for lenders since courts
60. Id. at 20,995. The United States filed an action for reimbursement of cleanup costs
against Mirabile, the owner of a hazardous waste site. Id. Mirabile, the defendant, joined
American Bank and Trust Company and Mellon Bank as third party defendants and there was
a counterclaim against the United States alleging involvement of the Small Business Association. Id. American Bank and Trust Company and the Small Business Association were granted
summary disposition. Id. The court found that American Bank and Trust merely foreclosed on
the premises after all operation had ceased and then took prudent and routine steps to secure
the property. Id. at 20,996. The Small Business Administration, although it had authority to
participate in management, did not actually participate. Id. at 20,996-97 Therefore, the court
granted protection under CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982), for both
the American Bank and the Small Business Administration and they were not held liable
under CERCLA. Id. at 20,996.
The court also held, however, that in connection with a third lender, Mellon Bank, a more
detailed factual inquiry would be necessary to determine whether their involvement triggered
CERCLA liability. Mellon Bank had sent advisors, one of whom may have participated in
day-to-day non-financial management decisions. Mellon Bank was also found to have refused
to provide enough money to meet environmental obligations. Id. at 20,997.
One commentator described the Mirabile decision as:
a bittersweet victory for the lending community. On one hand, the court virtually
dismissed the significance of the lender's purchase of its security property in determining CERCLA liability. On the other hand, the court cautioned that any lender,
whether its loans are secured by real or personal property, may be liable if it becomes too involved in its borrower's operations.
Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste
Cleanup, 38 HASTINGs L.J. 1261, 1279 (1987) (authored by Scott Wilsdon).
61. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L.Rep. at 20,997.
62. Id. at 20,995.
63. Id.
64. A lender must create a balance between the desire to attain control and oversee its
borrower's business, and the necessity to stay removed from activities not involved in the financial aspect of the business. Some lenders may argue that almost all management decisions
have a potential effect on the security of the loan, thereby creating tension between the
lender's ability to determine what it needs to properly monitor its loan and the court's interpretation as to how much contact with the company will trigger CERCLA liability.
An analogy can be made to the protection given to a limited partner. As a general matter,
if a limited partner plays too close a role in the management of the partnership, the limited
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will be evaluating lending practices to determine if there is sufficient
involvement with borrowers to trigger CERCLA liability.
Furthermore, a lender may also be held liable as an "owner or
operator" if the lender forecloses on the property and does not immediately resell the premises. 5 In United States v. Maryland Bank &
Trust Co.,66 the court stated that if the bank was not held liable
when they hold property after foreclosure, the lender would be unjustly enriched by gaining property which the federal government
had borne the cost of cleanup.6 7 The court concluded that the securpartner will lose the protection of limited liability. See Uniformed Limited Partnership Act §
17, 6 U.L.A. 601 (Master ed. 1969). Similarly, the lender who plays too close a role in the
management of its borrower's business may arguably assume any liability for clean-up costs,
where that borrower is responsible for hazardous waste.
Corporate shareholders and officers have potential secondary CERCLA liability similar to
that of lenders. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810
F,2d 726, 742-44 (8th Cir.) (holding that an officer who had direct supervision or arranged for
the disposal and a stockholder who played an active role in management of the company were
individually liable for CERCLA cleanup costs), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United
States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 894-95 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (holding that a corporate officer
who exercises authority on behalf of the corporation or who arranges for the disposal of the
waste is liable for CERCLA cleanup costs). For further discussion of corporate liability, see
Murphy, The Impact of "Superfund" and Other Environmental Statues on Commercial
Lending and Investment Activities, 41 Bus. LAW. 1133, 1145-52 (1986); Note, CERCLA Defendants: The Problem of Expanding Liability and DiminishingDefenses, 31 WASH. U.J. URB.
& CONTEMP. L. 289, 298-300 (1987) (authored by Cynthia S. Korhonen & Mark W. Smith).
65. See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
66. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). The bank had made various loans to the previous
owner and when the son of the previous owner wanted to buy the family farm, the bank loaned
him money as well. Id. at 575. A short time after the son bought the property, he stopped
making loan payments and the bank began foreclosure proceedings. Id. Approximately a year
after the foreclosure, the EPA inspected the property and discovered hazardous waste which
was improperly disposed of on the property. Id. The United States, in turn, sued Maryland
Bank for costs incurred in cleanup. Id. at 574-75
The court held that the bank was liable for cleanup costs because full title vested in the
bank when they purchased the property at the foreclosure sale because the bank no longer had
a security interest in the property. Id. at 579. Since the bank held the premises for an unreasonable length of time, the court held that they were precluded from claiming any exemption
of payment. Id. at 579 n.5. The court made no mention of any possible activity the bank had
engaged in while owning the site. The time period that would be considered reasonable for the
lender to hold onto property after foreclosure is still an open issue. In light of Maryland Bank
& Trust Co., however, it would be advisable for the lender to do an investigation of the property before foreclosure and to discard the property as soon after foreclosure as market conditions permit. Berz & Sexton, Lending into HazardousSubstance Liability: The Secured Creditor as "Owner" Under Superfund, 12 CHEM. WASTE LITIG. REP. 35, 45 (1986).
67. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 580. The court, expressing its concern
over the equity of the distribution of the cleanup costs, stated:
the federal government alone would shoulder the cost of cleaning up the site, while
the former mortgagee-turned-owner . . . benefit[s] from the clean-up by the increased value of the now unpolluted land. At the foreclosure sale, the mortgagee
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ity interest which was afforded protection under CERCLA section

101(20)(A), 8 "terminated at the foreclosure sale ... at which time

it ripened into full title. '" 9 The court noted that lenders have means
of protecting themselves by making prudent loans and argued that
extra protection is not necessary.7
Nevertheless, in the typical situation, where the lender forecloses with the intent to resell the facility and apply the proceeds to
satisfy the outstanding debt, automatic liability should not be incurred.71 The potentially dangerous time period for the lender is
when the lender buys the property at a foreclosure sale in order to
maximize its return, and hazardous waste is then discovered on the
premises. This would greatly reduce the value of the property and
may also force the lender to bear the costs of cleanup. 2
In defining "owner or operator" CERCLA makes an exception
for a security interest in property.73 If the creditor, however, becomes overly entangled in the affairs of the company, the exception
will not be afforded to the creditor. 4 It is important for lenders to
could acquire the property cheaply. All other prospective purchasers would be faced
with potential CERCLA liability, and would shy away from the sale. Yet once the
property has been cleared ... the mortgagee-turned-owner would be in a position to
sell the site at a profit.
Id. at 580. Authors have argued that the court's rationale is flawed because CERCLA cleanup
costs can be grossly disproportionate to the value of the property prior to the contamination.
See, e.g., Soriano & Lockett, Hazardous Waste Liability: The Emerging Problem for Lenders, 12 CHEM. WASTE LITIG. REP. 47, 57-58 (1986). It is furthered argued that "while it may
be inappropriate to grant a lending institution a windfall at the government's expense, it may
be equally inappropriate to penalize an innocent lending institution by imposing a liability the
amount of which greatly exceeds the value of the land .. " Id.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982).
69. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 579.
70. Id. at 580. The court further commented that "[t]he mortgagees also have the options of not foreclosing and not bidding at the foreclosure sale. Both steps would apparently
insulate the mortgagee from liability." Id. at 580 n.6. However, one obvious result of not
foreclosing on the collateral is that the chance of recovering any amount owed on the loan
would be greatly diminished, and possibly eliminated.
71. Berz & Sexton, supra note 66, at 44. The situation in Maryland Bank & Trust Co.,
632 F. Supp. at 573, is the atypical case. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
Although under normal lending practices where the property would be sold as soon as possible
after foreclosure, liability should not be incurred and precautions such as environmental auditing should be taken. See infra notes 91-149 and accompanying text (discussing environmental
auditing and its use by lenders); see also Berz & Sexton, supra note 66, at 45-46.
72. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
73. CERCLA § 101(B)(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. §9601(20)(A) (1982) (providing that the
term "owner or operator" "does not include a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security
interest in the vessel or facility."); see supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text (discussing the limitation of the third
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recognize dangerous lending practices and either avoid or minimize
the effect of these activities. Such practices include: (1) requiring
clauses in the security agreement allowing a lender to approve managerial appointments; (2) requiring clauses in the security agreement
allowing a lender to approve major business transactions of the borrower; (3) requiring clauses in the security agreement whereby a
lender would provide "management assistance"; (4) hiring management consultants; and (5) being actually involved in manufacturing
or design changes.75 Purely financial intervention such as (1) placing
mandatory caps on dividends and salaries of officers of the borrowercorporation, (2) reserving the right to approve the purchasing of life
insurance by the borrower for its employees, (3) general involvement
in accounting and record keeping of the borrower, and (4) assistance
with marketing and sales strategies and tactics that do not involve
the production, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste, are likely to
be insufficient activities to characterize the lender as an owner or
operator. 8 Potential liability could arise, however, when a lender
places numerous conditions and restrictions in the loan agreement,
even if all such conditions are financial in nature; abundant provisos
made by the lender may be construed by a court as sufficient involvement to impose Superfund liability on the lender.77
One option for a lender confronted with a borrower engaged in
activities which may result in Superfund liability is to force the borrower into bankruptcy. 78 The lender may see this as a means of
avoiding potential liability while engaging in workout procedures or
foreclosure. 9 In Ohio v. Kovacs,8" the Supreme Court held that an
injunction ordering the cleanup of a hazardous waste site could, in
certain circumstances, give rise to a dischargeable claim in
bankruptcy.8 1
In a more recent case, however, the Supreme Court held that a
party defense when the lender is in very close contact with the management of the borrower's
business). See generally Burcat, supra note 15, at 513-24.
75. Berz & Sexton, supra note 66, at 41-42.
76. Id. at 42-43.
77. Id. at 43. In addition, liability may arise if the lender is generally involved in the
financial affairs of a borrower corporation that is actually in the business of hazardous substances. See id.
78. Soriano & Lockett, supra note 67, at 59-60.
79. Id.
80. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
81. Id. at 284-85. The Court noted, however, "that [defendant's] discharge will shield
him from prosecution for having violated the environmental laws of Ohio or for criminal contempt for not performing his obligations under the injunction prior to bankruptcy." Id. at 284.
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bankruptcy trustee may not abandon a hazardous waste site "in contravention of a state statute or regulation that is reasonably designed
to protect the public health or safety from identified hazards." 2
Abandonment would not be permitted without formulating conditions which would adequately protect the health and safety of the
public, even if the property was worth substantially less than the cost
of cleanup.83 It has been suggested that this result is based on the
reasoning that in some situations environmental considerations outweigh the "fresh start" policy of the Bankruptcy Code.84 Judicial
decisionmaking influenced by environmental concerns encumber the
debtor's estate and therefore reduce the secured creditor's potential
for recapturing its investment. As a consequence, there may be a
significant impact on lenders' business practices.8a In order to best
calculate the risks of an investment when a lender enters into a security arrangement, lenders must be aware of the possible effects
hazardous waste cleanup may have if a borrower files for
bankruptcy.
82. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 507
(1986). The Court explained the following:
This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee ... is a narrow one.
It does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate future violation of such laws
that may stem from abandonment. The abandonment power is not to be fettered by
laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public health or safety
from imminent and identifiable harm.
Id. at 507 n.9. Although "Midlantic does not explicitly impose CERCLA (or the state law
equivalent) liability on a bankruptcy trustee or a debtor's estate... the decision accomplishes
the same result because it requires a trustee to use estate assets to clean up hazard waste
sites." Soriano & Lockett, supra note 67, at 62.
83. Midlantic Nat'l Bank, 474 U.S. at 507; see e.g. In re Wall Tube & Metal Products
Co., 831 F.2d 118, 124 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that hazardous waste site response costs are
entitled to administrative expense priority where such costs are "actual and necessary" to preserve the estate and protect the health and safety of the public).
84.

See Soriano & Lockett, supra note 67, at 50.

85. Id. at 62. The impact of bankruptcy proceedings on hazardous waste litigation is
beyond the scope of this Note. For further discussion, see Drabkin, Moorman & Kirsch, Bankruptcy and the Cleanup of Hazardous Waste: Caveat Creditor, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,168 (1985); Environmental Compliance, Permitting and Cleanup Obligations: To
What Extent Should They Take Precedence Over ObligationsDuring and After Bankruptcy?,
in Div. FOR PUB. SERV., A.B.A., BURDENS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ON PRIVATE
PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: REASONABLE OR UNREASONABLE? 4
(1987); Schnapf, Environmental Cleanup Obligations and the Bankruptcy Trustee's Abandonment Power: Dumping on the Creditor?, 59 N.Y. ST. B.J., Oct. 1987, at 40; Note, Abandoning
Hazardous Waste Sites in Bankruptcy: Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department
of Environmental Protection, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 555 (1986) (authored by Adam Sachs).
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PROTECTION FROM LIABILITY FOR LENDERS

It is unrealistic for lenders to simply refuse to lend to borrowers
who may later incur CERCLA liability. 6 At the present time, this is

especially true since many industries previously believed to be safe
may, in fact, engage in activity which could result in future liability
due to hazardous waste.87 Lenders cannot simply withdraw from financing commercial enterprises because this would cause lenders to
give up a major source of business.8" This does not mean that lenders
should continue traditional lending practices. Rather, lenders must
safeguard and reduce their risk of liability in light of the potential
exposure produced by the improper or accidental release of hazardous material.8 9 There are several methods a lender may use to protect itself, although none insure total immunity from potential future
CERCLA liability.9"
A.

Environmental Auditing

An environmental audit is an independent evaluation identifying
existing environmental problems with an industrial site and facility. 9
This formal assessment can assist in managing potentially hazardous
environmental conditions within an industrial plant and determining
a facility's compliance with applicable environmental laws.92 It is
also useful in obtaining an objective evaluation of a plant in light of
present environmental standards. 3 The purpose of an environmental
86. See Banks Increasingly at Risk from Liability for Pollution Problems, Banking
Official Says, 17 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1624 (Jan. 23, 1987).
87. Id. For example, one bank official commented that the bank financed the purchase
of a wood processing plant which resulted in foreclosure. Id. As it turned out there was a
hazardous waste site on the premises, and before the bank could sell the property, it was
responsible for cleaning up a hazardous waste site on the premises. Id.
88. See id. Banks would be required to abstain from financing anything involving the
debtor's estate. Id.
89. Malcolm T. Murray, President of the National Association of Bank Loan and Credit
Officers, agrees that traditional lending practices should continue. Mr. Murray comments that
"[i]nstead of forgoing [sic] the market, we have to learn how to deal with it." Id.
90. See infra notes 91-203 and accompanying text (discussing the various methods of
protection available to a lender).
91. See Maurer, The Environmental Audit: A Management Tool, in IMPACT ON BustNESS TRANSACTIONS: 1988, supra note 44, at 327, 329. "An environmental audit is a formal
detailed appraisal conducted by or for an operational facility of a business to determine its
compliance posture to current federal, state and local environmental laws and regulations." Id.
92. See generally Angelo & Bergeson, The Expanding Scope of Liabilityfor Environmental Damage and Its Impact on Business Transactions, 8 CORP. L. REV. 101, 117-18
(1985) (discussing the inquiries included within an environmental audit).
93. H.W. BLAKESLEE & T. GRABOWSKI, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PLANT ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS 1-2 (1985).
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report is to identify and confirm environmental hazards which exist
on the premises. 4
Environmental auditing is a "proactive" approach of hazardous
waste maintenance which encourages early detection of environmental problems.9 5 This allows remediation as soon as possible.96 Since
cleanup costs may be dramatically reduced by early detection, auditing is extremely cost-effective.97 To be successful, the audit should
identify both the strengths and weaknesses in the environmental programs presently in place by the company. 8 It is also essential to
accurately document on-site conditions and operations.9"
The environmental audit may also be used as a compliance
mechanism, in addition to its use in identifying and correcting environmental hazards.' 00 The EPA believes that "[a]uditing serves as a
quality assurance check to help improve the effectiveness of basic
environmental management by verifying that management practices
are in place, functioning and adequate."'' In a policy statement, the
EPA warns that audits evaluate, but are not substitutes for, direct
compliance activities such as obtaining permits, monitoring compliance, reporting violations to the EPA and keeping good records. 02
The EPA's policy is to encourage voluntary use of auditing in order
to maintain management's commitment to programs designed for en94. See id. at 2-3. An audit may help uncover both past practices which may have gone
unnoticed by management and the location and identification of existing waste disposal so that
future problems associated with the disposal may be assessed. Witmer, Environmental Audits
in Connection with Property Purchases and Sales, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, THE IMPACT OF

ENVIRONMENTAL

REGULATIONS

ON

BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS-REAL

PROPERTY

TRANSFERS AND MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 287, 290 (1986) [hereinafter IMPACT OF BusINESS TRANSACTIONS: 1986].

95.

H.W.

BLAKESLEE

& T.M.

GRABOWSKI,

supra note 93, at 3.

96. Id. at 4.
97.

Id. at 3.

98. Id.
99. Fourth Annual Hazardous Waste Litigation Symposium 88 (Oct. 19-20, 1987) (on
file at Hofstra Law Review) [hereinafter Symposium].
100. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004 (1986). "[T]he impetus for environmental-compliance auditing did not come from the promulgation of the large

body of environmental regulations." Huelsman, The Auditor's Perspective, in THF MCGRAWHILL ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING HANDBOOK pt. 3, at 4 (L.L. Harrison ed. 1984) [hereinafter
AUDITING HANDBOOK]. Rather, the impetus came from a series of Security and Exchange
Commission (SEC) rulings in the early 1980's on the disclosure of environmental liability. Id.
Now that the EPA is taking a strong position on dealing with offenders, corporations are under
more pressure to carry out auditing. Id.
101. 51 Fed. Reg. at 25,006.
102. Id.
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vironmental safety.10 3 Voluntary auditing may lead to the reform of
compliance regulation, thereby allowing the private sector to selfregulate to a certain extent."' °
Several methodologies may be used to develop an effective environmental audit. Depending on the needs of the individual company
and the complexity of potential environmental impacts, different
techniques and levels of sophistication will be needed to assure a successful audit. 10 5 The EPA believes that to ensure a successful audit,
the audit must be performed by an independent auditing team of
adequate size and the team must be trained for the particular job.106
103. Id.
104. Palmisano, EnvironmentalAuditing as a Management Information System, in AuDITING HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at 5-28. Palmisano states the following:
[The] EPA believes that private-sector environmental compliance assurance
and auditing provide an opportunity for developing compliance regulatory reform.
Simple logic dictates that as the private sector assumes greater responsibility for
ensuring compliance with environmental regulations, the public-sector role could diminish. However, for this to become a reality, EPA would need to be assured of the
acceptability and integrity of the private programs, i.e., the agency would need to
establish characteristics of effective private-sector compliance-assurance programs.
In addition, companies would need assurance that these programs would not
work to their disadvantage and that EPA would not use them to increase, rather
than reduce, the regulatory burden.
Id.
105. Stoller, Environmental Audits, in Fifth Annual Environmental Law Symposium
108, 109 (Oct. 17-18, 1988) (on file at Hofstra Law Review). Hazardous waste "[s]ites can
range from virgin land to a highly developed piece of industrial land that contains lagoons,
waste dump sites, barrel storage, underground storage tanks, incinerators and wet processes."
Id. Nonetheless, "while the scope of work for these two extremes would be very different...
the approach is basically the same." Id.
106. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004, 25,006, 25,009
(1986). An auditing team must be tailored to the specific facility being monitored. Typically
the team should include:
(1) technical personnel who understand the operation of the business and the
nature of the potential contaminants;
(2) regulatory compliance staff who understand present and past compliance
and disposal methods of wastes;
(3) lawyers to define legal requirements and to apply the terms to the business
transaction;
(4) a team leader to coordinate and plan the audit.
DeMeester, PracticalGuidance for Due Diligence Environmental Auditing, 18 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,210, 10,212 (1988). The use of a diversified team "provides an integrated
capability to develop site assessments and property management strategies." Koczan, Environmental Audits and Their Application to Real Property Transfers, Acquisitions and Divestitures, in IMPAcT ON BusiNEss TRANSACTIONS: 1986, supra note 94, at 271, 277.
One commentator has suggested that the need for an attorney may benefit the facility

owner by providing attorney-client privilege for findings, thereby preventing the premature
dissemination of confidential results to outside parties. Maurer, supra note 91, at 333; see also
Levin, An EPA Response on Confidentiality in Environmental Auditing, 13 Envtl. L. Rep.
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Management support is also essential for a successful auditing program."° " The EPA also believes that the objectives must be clearly
defined and put in a concise, clear report.108 Furthermore, the data
gathered must be sufficiently analyzed in order to achieve the stated
objectives of the report.109
Since strict compliance with existing laws may not adequately
ensure against future liability, the audit should include a scrutinization of possible hazardous substances which are used at the site.110
Particular attention should be paid to substances known to be, or
suspected to be carcinogens, as well as those which have acute toxic
effects.1 '
One method of auditing is a substance-by-substance analysis
which identifies regulated substances and evaluates the risk and
compliance obligations associated with each." 2 This technique allows
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,346 (1983) (discussing the issues involved in confidentiality of environmental reports). A lender should be aware of this protection and require immediate notification of
any findings in order to prevent the borrower from hiding behind the shield of attorney-client
privilege.
107. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004, 25,006, 25,009
(1986).
108. Id. at 25,009.
109. Id. at 25,009. It is particularly important for lenders to follow the guidance of the
EPA since the main concern for lenders is making sure their borrowers stay within the boundaries of the regulations set forth by the EPA. If the lender follows the guidance of the EPA
and maintains that it does not know nor have reason to know of the hazard then the lender
would most likely have a valid defense under SARA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (Supp. IV
1986).
110. Vanderver, Environmental Auditing, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 437,
444 (7th ed. 1983). Vanderver has noted that:
under Section 107 of CERCLA, generators of hazardous waste are now liable for
the cost of cleaning up abandoned hazardous waste sites at which their waste was
disposed of. The fact that the generator complied with all applicable legal requirements at the time the waste was deposited at the disposal site is ... no defense to
liability under this statute.
Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 445-46. Vanderver makes the following comments concerning the substanceby-substance method:
This method [of analysis] is particularly appropriate where applicable regulatory
requirements focus on particular substances.... If any of the substances identified
under... [statutes such as RCRA or CERCLA] are present at a facility, the audit
can focus on whether they are managed in accordance with applicable requirements.
In addition, if the audit is designed to identify potential future liabilities arising out
of the currently lawful management of hazardous or toxic substances, the substance-by-substance approach is essential.
Id. Ideally, the removal, disposal or by-products of every material entering the facility should
be accounted for in the audit. Maurer, supra note 91, at 338.
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parties to identify substances present at the site, evaluate the fate of
each substance tracked, and analyze the legal regulations in handling problem substances." 3 In addition, since lenders are interested
in future liability, an assessment of the potential future impacts of
the substances should be made." 4 Even if the tested substances are
currently being managed in accordance with the law, a prediction of
the long-term effects of the substance should be made to assure a
thorough understanding of the risks involved with the material being
used or discarded." 5
Another method of auditing is an analysis of the legal requirements consisting of a survey of environmental laws and regulations." The survey will result in a schematic approach including all
environmental compliance requirements under federal and state statutes and regulations. 117 The use of a checklist may be useful in this
analysis." 8 A checklist, however, merely gives baseline data which
must then be evaluated." 9 A matrix system may be used instead of a
checklist in order to make the survey more elaborate.' 20 However, a
113.

Vanderver, supra note 110, at 446.

114.
115.

Id.
See id.

116. See id. at 448-49.
117.

Id. at 448. "This method evaluates compliance with legal requirements concerning

management practices and prevention of environmental pollution." Id. at 449.
118.

See Symposium, supra note 99, at 75-85. One checklist that has been suggested for

a pre-acquisition audit includes:
I. General Issues for Investigation
-Applicable Regulations
-Enforcement History
-Environmental Compliance Management
-Insurance Issues
II. Documents for Review
Should include permits, reports and records for the operation of regulated
operations such as boiler, and incinerator operations and waste water
disposal.

Ill. Observation checklist
-Air Pollution Control
-Water Pollution Control
-Spill Prevention and Control
-Solid and Hazardous Waste Management
Id. This checklist is merely an abbreviated sampling of what should be included. The most
extensive checklist possible is a checklist which will allow a lender to effectively evaluate potential hazardous waste contamination on the sites of their borrowers and will allow a lender to

most productively evaluate their risk of liability under CERCLA.
119. J. HEER & DJ. HAGERTY, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS

AND STATEMENTS

159

(1977). For an example of how baseline data can be evaluated, see id. at 159-63.

120. A matrix is a grid where quantitative estimates of numerous materials are analyzed
for the impact of the materials in different situations. Id. at 156. An example of a matrix
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matrix may suffer from the problem of inflexibility and may also
limit the evaluation of secondary impacts of hazards." 1
Auditing through the use of a survey, using either a checklist or
a matrix, is particularly useful in evaluating compliance with regulations concerning management practices.' 22 Additionally, a survey
may enhance the discovery of environmental pollution which would
otherwise be missed through other methods of auditing. 23 Thus, a
survey may be the favorable method of auditing for a lender because
requirements of the company and will identify nonit evaluates legal
24
compliance.1
There are two other methods of auditing available. One is a unit
process analysis which calls for an examination of each individual
area of a plant to determine whether potential hazards exist in any
of them and an identification of all points where pollutants are being
discharged. 2 5 An alternative technique is an analysis of the methods
of disposal utilized at the plant, done through the identification of air
1 26
emission, water discharge and disposal of waste in or on land.
However, neither of these two techniques should be the lender's first
choice because they involve the day-to-day handling of material,
27
which may expose the lender to the possibility of liability.
Whichever method the lender chooses, the audit report should
include: (1) a statement of the purpose of the report and the procedures used; (2) an indication of the scope of the work; (3) a review
of the results; and (4) a list of conclusions and suggested solutions.'2
In addition to the environmental audit which should be performed on the premises to be used as collateral prior to entering into
a security arrangement, 129 the lender should also require on-going
would be "[o]ne hundred possible activities ... listed in the matrix along one axis, with 88
possible impacts listed along the other axis. Thus, 8,800 interactions can be displayed or indicated by means of this matrix." Id.
121. See id. at 158.
122. Vanderver, supra note 110, at 449.
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 446-47. "Each unit process is examined to determine whether it is a closed
system, and if not, at what points within the system pollutants are routinely released or where
they may be accidentally discharged." Id.
126. Id. at 448.
127. See United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20992 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 4, 1985); see supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text (discussing the problem with
over-involvement by lenders in the management of their borrowers' businesses).
128. H.W. BLAKESLEE & T.M. GRABOWSKI, supra note 93, at 43-46, 49-51.
129. Pre-transactional audits are important in assisting lenders in making intelligent
evaluations on the feasibility of loans. See generally Vanderver, supra note 110, at 437-43.
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reports. 13 0 This will ensure a good faith effort by the borrower to
comply with regulations and to correct situations before a condition
becomes so serious that it is no longer economically feasible for the
borrower to effectuate the necessary cleanup.' Because of the growing concern over environmental hazards, audits are likely to play a
much greater role in future real estate transactions: "It is projected
that environmental audits ... will be found next to the termite certificate and the deed of trust [or mortgage] in future property
files."' 3 2
The auditing program should also be evaluated and updated to
reflect changes in personnel and regulations. 33 "In keeping up-to-

date, the program not only maintains its effectiveness, but also will
create an accurate awareness of the current environmental status of
all operations and reduce the potential for undesirable surprises."' 34
When a lender is contemplating foreclosure proceedings, an environmental audit should be considered. The evaluation will help the
lender make an informed business decision regarding the property. If
the audit concludes hazardous waste is present or the potential for

contamination is large, then the lender may choose not to foreclose
or if the lender does foreclose, it may choose not to bid at the fore-

closure sale.

35

The audit at the time of foreclosure will allow the

130. See generally infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text (discussing the necessity
of an on-going auditing process).
131. Id. at 442-43. While on-going reports help to assure that the situation is easily
rectifiable, for certain conditions they may limit the necessary cleanup through early detection.
See supra notes 94-104 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose and benefits of environmental audits). In addition, auditing will not protect against the sudden accidental release
of hazardous material. However, this should be addressed through the procurement of adequate liability insurance on the premises. See infra notes 150-89 and accompanying text (discussing the use of insurance to protect lenders as well as its deficiencies). Auditing may, nevertheless, detect defects and damage to equipment, which may prevent the accident altogether
and reduce costs considerably. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
132. Symposium, supra note 99, at 89. The body of environmental knowledge on which
to base an auditing system is relatively new and therefore the auditing systems are still in their
early formation. Huelsman, supra note 100, pt. 3, at 4. Because of all the new developments in
regulating hazardous material and the new tougher enforcement policies undertaken by the
EPA, auditing methods and demands are merely in their infancy. Id. Universities have begun
extensive work in the area, and engineering and law schools have started offering specialized
courses to begin to address the needs for the present and the future. See id.
133. Friedman & Giannotti, Environmental Self-Assessment, in D. SIvE & F. FRIEDMAN, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 345, 348 (1987).
134. Id.
135. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text (discussing possible liability resulting from a lenders holding of contaminated land for an extended period of time after foreclosure). Since the cost of cleanup may exceed the value of the property, it may actually be less
expensive to sell the contaminated property than to pay for its cleanup--if a buyer could be
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lender to know its position and best determine how to mitigate its
losses.' 3 6
Environmental auditing has a number of limitations and potential problems for the lender.13 7 One problem is that each report is a
"snapshot" interpretation which may alter as changes occur in the
plant, the regulations, and the standards over time.' 38 What were

once believed to be safe procedures and substances may not be
viewed as such in the future."3 9
Another problem is that an audit can generate a large volume
of data to be evaluated, 4" which requires expertise in environmental
science and environmental regulations in order for the analysis of the
audit report to be meaningful. 4 ' A lender will probably lack the
necessary expertise. In addition, auditing should neither replace ongoing environmental awareness nor cause management to rely so
heavily on the auditing that they become disassociated with environ-

42
mental concerns at the site.Moreover, the audit may be met with resistance by the potential
borrower. The borrower may be concerned with the preservation of
trade secrets, confidentiality of the audit findings, use of the audit
results in civil litigation, and the possibility of future criminal prosecution due to the increased level of knowledge.' 43 These concerns,
found.
136. See Vollmann, Double Jeopardy: Lender Liability Under Superfund, 16 REAL EST.
L.J. 3, 18 (1987). Vollman comments that "[i]f the lender could become primarily liable as an
owner or operator of the property, the lender may be better off forfeiting its collateral." Id.
137. Friedman & Giannotti, supra note 133, at 375 (noting that without other management systems, auditing may lead to potential problems for the lender).
138. Id. The audit, without other management systems, is a "limited aspect of effective
environmental management." Id.; see also Vanderver supra note 110 at 444 (noting that
"[b]ecause a company's activities frequently change, as do the legal requirements which may
apply to those activities, a snapshot audit is of relatively limited value."). But cf. H.W.
BLAKESLEE & T.M. GRABOWSKI, supra note 93, at 2. Blakeslee and Grabowski observe that an
"audit ...

can be likened to preparing a plant environmental profile ...

[which] is comple-

mented ... by an examination of past activities and future liabilities. For this reason, it may
not be entirely appropriate to call an audit an 'environmental snapshot in time.'" Id.
139. This forces the lender to try to predict the future and calculate what will be considered safe procedures in years to come. Lenders do not usually have expertise in environmental
issues and the evaluation of risks of future environmental hazards may be beyond the scope of
lender knowledge. Although including future predictions in the audit will help, it can in no
way be used as a true risk-minimizing factor. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
140. Witmer, supra note 94, at 292.
141. Id. at 293.
142. H.W. BLAKESLEE & T.M. GRABOWSKI, supra note 93, at 1-2. If management does
not stay involved and informed about environmental concerns, the company may not attempt
to resolve problems related to hazardous disposal and waste before they occur.
143. Maurer, supra note 91, at 338-39.
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however, are not present in a number of industries where the risks of
liability are relatively low. Moreover, if these concerns are raised by
the borrower, the lender should be alerted to the possibility that the
borrower may be trying to hide high risk activities which may lead
to CERCLA liability.
Lenders should also be aware the use of auditing can be a
double-edged sword. For example: (1) the lender's demand for environmental auditing may be considered unrelated to financial matters
of the borrower, thereby increasing the chance of liability""' and (2)
the lender's insistence that the borrower engage in continual environmental auditing may create a condition subsequent to the security
contract which may prevent the lender from using a "third party"
defense against liability under SARA. 45 Furthermore, the EPA
takes the position that "the existence of an auditing program does
not create any defense to or otherwise limit, the responsibility of any
regulated entity to comply with applicable regulatory
requirements.' ' 0
The implementation of an environmental auditing program is an
attempt by lenders to further a defense under CERCLA section
107(b) that the lender had no reason to know of the violation. 4
Nevertheless, if an audit is done but does not detect an existing
problem, it could be argued that the lender had "reason to know" of
the hazard but failed to use due diligence in detecting the problem.1 48 Furthermore, if a problem is detected, the lender cannot ignore such a problem and may be under an affirmative obligation to
ensure that the trouble is resolved in order to preclude CERCLA
1 49
liability.
144. See supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text (discussing the potential CERCLA
liability if a lender becomes over involved in the management of its borrower).
145. See supra note 35-44 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility that the
relationship between the borrower and the lender could be considered "contractual" within the

meaning of SARA, thereby preventing a successful "third party" defense).
146.

Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25004 (1986).

147. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982).
148. See Chesler, Environmental Provisions in Real Estate Contracts, in IMPACT ON
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: 1986, supra note 94, at 311, 331. Chesler states the following:

The Superfund Amendments [SARA] specifically provide that for the defendant to
show he had "no reason to know" of the problem, the defendant must have under-

taken, at the time of the acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into previous ownership
and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in
an effort to minimize liability.
Id.
149. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing liability through a contractual relationship with the disposer of hazardous waste); cf. Angelo & Bergeson, supra note 92,
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B. Insurance

The use of insurance as a viable means of protection against
losses stemming from hazardous waste has changed since the implementation of SARA, which established statutory guidelines concerning alternative methods of insurance for landowners with high risk of
waste contamination.1 50 Several kinds of insurance which protect
against potential damage caused by hazardous material should be
considered when requiring hazard insurance for prospective borrowers.151 Different insurance policies provide different coverage for hazardous waste and in certain industries special insurance is going to
be needed to assure that cleanup costs and other liabilities are
covered.
1. Comprehensive General Liability Insurance.- Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) insurance indemnifies the insured
against loss caused by legal liability and covers damages as a result
of "bodily injury" 152 or "property damage"153 caused by an "accident"1 54 or "occurrence" 1 55 which arises out of specific hazards. 5 6
at 120 (explaining that if an environmental audit is performed and does not detect an existing
problem, the seller may argue it should not be responsible for information which could have
been discovered if the appropriate test was performed).
150. SARA established guidelines for insurance and created new insurance groups such
as "risk retention groups," which insure sites that were virtually uninsurable prior to the
amendment of CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9671-9674 (Supp. IV 1986); infra notes 166-89
and accompanying text (discussing use of self insurance for businesses with high risk of hazardous waste).
151. See infra notes 152-70 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits and limitations of Comprehensive General Liability Policies); infra notes 171-78 and accompanying text
(discussing the relative benefits and limitations of Environmental Impairment Liability policies); infra notes 179-84 and accompanying text (discussing the possible uses and problems
with risk retention groups).
152. "Bodily injury" is defined as "bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by any
person which occurs during the policy period, including death at any time resulting therefrom." 2 R. LONG & M. RHODES, LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 10.05 (1986).
153. "Property damage" is typically defined in a policy as:
(1) physical injury to or destruction of tangible property which occurs during the
policy period, including the loss of use thereof at any time resulting therefrom, or
(2) loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically injured or destroyed provided such loss of use is caused by an occurrence during the policy
period.
Id. § 10.05 (emphasis in original).
154. An "accident" is generally regarded as "a fortuitous event which is neither expected nor intended." Id. § 10.04.
155. An "'[o]ccurrence' is a term of art which is usually defined in the policy as 'an
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."
Id. (emphasis in original).
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Some courts have held that the dumping of hazardous waste and the
resulting damages constitute an "occurrence" within the meaning of
the CGL policy; therefore, the policy will cover such an incident.1 57
Environmental damage is generally considered "property damage"
under CGL policies. 158 CERCLA response costs, however, may or
may not be considered covered "damages" under CGL policies. 159 It
156. Id. § 10.01.
157. See, e.g., Mraz v. American Universal Ins. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1173 (D. Md. 1985)
(holding that despite the fact that the chemicals were intentionally dumped, the leakage
should be considered an occurrence within the meaning of the CGL policy in question since
the damages were unexpected and unintentional), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Mraz v.
Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986). In Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v.
Liberty Solvents and Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (1984), the court
held that "the 'release or threatened releases' of hazardous waste materials ... are 'occurrences' within the common understanding of that term. Furthermore... [the] release of chemical substances into the environment were neither expected nor intended .... Id. at 132, 477
N.E.2d at 1233.
158. See Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1327-30; Port of Portland v. Water Quality Ins. Syndicate,
796 F.2d 1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp.
152, 193-94 (W.D. Mo. 1986).
159. There have been recent challenges by insurers to the inclusion of governmental
cleanup costs within the meaning of "damages" under CGL policies. While several insurers
have argued that the cleanup is equitable relief which would not constitute damages under the
CGL policy, many courts have rejected this argument. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. The Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F.Supp. 1171 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that under California
law, damages are compensation for the detriment suffered from an unlawful activity and that
the state had, in fact, suffered a detriment and was entitled to damages); Township of
Gloucester v. Maryland Casualty Co., 668 F. Supp. 394 (D.N.J. 1987) (holding that the cost
of cleanup and closing of a landfill constitutes damages under a CGL policy). In Sharon Steel
Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., Nos. C-87-2306 & 2311, (Dist. Ct. Salt Lake County,
Utah, June 20, 1988), the court held that:
[d]efendant's attempt to distinguish damages as a substantial remedy from restitution as a restorative remedy is an artificial approach to determining the meaning of
the word "damages" in these insurance contracts. Both restitution and damages are
remedies seeking to compensate for a loss or an injury .... It would be unfortunate
to .construe the word "damages" in such a way to deny recovery when the subject
property can be restored but allow recovery when compensation would be substantial for fortuitously destroyed property.
Id. at 18.
Two circuits, however, have distinguished claims for damages from claims for injunctive
and restitutionary relief. These courts have held that if the government cleans up the site and
sues for the cost of cleanup, this is not money damages and is therefore not contemplated by
the legal meaning of "damages" in the CGL policy. See Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.) (reh'g en banc) (reversing prior decision and holding that cleanup costs are remediation expenses which are prophylactic in nature
and thus are not "damages" as contemplated by the policy), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 66
(1988); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that a
claim against an insured for reimbursement of CERCLA response costs at a hazardous waste
site does not constitute a claim for damages under the insured's policy because the response
costs are equitable in nature), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 703 (1988).
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is also important to recognize that response costs may not be covered
if either the resulting harm or the mandated cleanup does not occur
during the policy period.160 This is likely since most "hazardous
waste liability insurance ...

is almost exclusively underwritten on a

'claims made' basis" rather than "occurrence" coverage.16 l This is
extremely important to a lender because if CERCLA response costs
are not covered by the insurance policy, the high cost of cleanup may
damage the financial stability of the borrower.' 62
Many CGL policies include a "Pollution Exclusion" clause
which excludes from coverage losses due to pollution which are not
caused by the "sudden and accidental" release of contaminants' 63 as
well as losses caused by active polluters of the environment.16 1 If the
160. Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 811 F.2d 1180
(8th Cir. 1987) (holding that the insurer had no duty to indemnify the insured if the cleanup
costs were incurred after the policy period had ended), rev'd on other grounds, 842 F.2d 977
(reh'g en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 66 (1988); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp.
665 (D. Idaho 1986) (holding that the insurer does not have the duty to indemnify the insured
for releases during the policy period if the resulting harm did not occur until after the policy
expires).
161. Parker, The Untimely Demise of the "Claims Made" Insurance Form?, 1983 DET.
C.L. REV.25, 29. Insurance issued on an "occurrence" basis covers the insured against liability
arising from any event occurring within the policy period, regardless of when such liability
actually arises, while a "claims made" policy only protects the insured against claims actually
filed against them during the policy period. See generally E. HOLMES & W. YOUNG, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 365-67 (2d ed. 1985).
162. See supra note 21 (discussing the costs of cleanup of hazardous waste sites).
163. See Rothenberg, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Loss, in SUPERFUND REPORT: WHAT Do RESPONSIBLE PARTIES Do Now? 80 (1986). A typical pollution exclusion
clause provides:
This coverage does not apply: . . .to bodily injury or property damages arising out
of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapor .... contaminants or
pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water;
but this exclusion does not apply, if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is
sudden and accidental.
R. LONG & M. RHODES, supra note 152, § 10.15 (emphasis in original). See generally Note,
The Pollution Exclusion in the Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy, 1986 U.
ILL. L. REV. 897 (authored by Richard F. Hunter) (discussing ambiguity in the CGL policy's
pollution exclusion clause).
164. R. LONG & M. RHODES, supra note 152, § 10.15. There is a question as to whether
the "sudden and accidental" language applies to the initial release of the pollutants or to the
damages caused by the contaminants. See Hadzi-Antich, Coveragefor Environmental Liabilities Under the Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy: How to Walk a Bull
Through a China Shop, 17 CONN. L. REv.769, 795 (1985).
Two theories have evolved within the judiciary. The first is the "release theory," which
focuses on the nature of the release of the substance into the environment. Note, Insurance
Coverage for Superfund Liability: A Plain Meaning Approach to the Pollution Exclusion
Clause, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 161, 172 (1987) (authored by Michael W. Peters). If the release
was sudden and accidental from the viewpoint of the insured, then the pollution exclusion
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clause is ambiguous, it must be interpreted in the light most
favorable to the insured.' 6' This rule of construction may allow a
reprieve for lenders who were unaware that such a clause was present in their borrower's insurance policy. In addition, the exclusion
may not apply where the discharge occurred in the regular course of
business or if the discharge occurred gradually over a long period of
time.' A pollution exclusion clause may also be inapplicable when
67
the dumping was unintended and unforeseeable.1
The duty of the insurer to defend the action is separate and
distinct from the duty to indemnify. 6 8 The insurer would have the
would not be applicable and the occurrence would be covered under the CGL. See, e.g., Payne
v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 625 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D. Fla. 1985); United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Armstrong, 479 So. 2d 1164 (Ala. 1985); Lansco, Inc. v. Department
of Envtl. Protection, 138 N.J. Super. 275, 350 A.2d 520 (1975), af'd, 145 N.J. Super. 433,
368 A.2d 363 (1976), cert. denied, 73 N.J. 57, 372 A.2d 322 (1977).
The second theory is the "damage theory," whereby a court focuses on the nature of the
damages. Note, supra, at 197. If the insured did not know or had no reason to know that
damage to the environment would occur as a result of the release of the pollutant, then the
CGL policy would cover the damages. See, e.g., Jackson Township Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 N.J. Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990 (1982); Niagara County v.
Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 103 Misc. 2d 814, 427 N.Y.S.2d. 171 (1980), aff'd, 80 A.D.2d 415, 439
N.Y.S.2d 538 (1981).
165. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(holding that when the policy language is ambiguous, it must be interpreted in a light most
favorable to the insured and ordinary definitions of undefined words should be defined by looking to the context of the contract as a whole), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
166. See Mraz v. American Universal Ins. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1173 (D. Md. 1985), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom., Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir.
1986); Waste Management of Carolinas Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d
374 (1986). But see American Motorist Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1423 (D.
Kan. 1987) (ruling that a pollution exclusion should be upheld when the insured-manufacturer
polluted over a 75 year period and continued polluting after being made aware of the problem); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 77 Or. App. 136, 711 P.2d 212 (1985), review denied,
301 Or. 76, 717 P.2d 631 (1986).
167. See Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F.
Supp. 1541 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that the pollution exclusion clause was not relevant
unless the damages were actually intended or at least substantially foreseeable). The court also
found that the insured was not an "active polluter" since the company did not know of the
release. Id. at 1548-49 (citing Payne v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 625 F. Supp. 1189
(S.D. Fla. 1985)).
168. The duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify or pay damages. The
insurer must defend an action whenever there is potential liability under the policy. See National Grange Mutual Ins. Co. v. Continental Casualty Ins. Co., 650 F. Supp. 1404, 1407-08
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Casualty Reciprocal Exeh. v. Thomas, 7 Kan. App. 2d 718, 720, 647 P.2d
1361, 1363 (1982); Spruill Motors, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 212 Kan. 681,
684, 512 P.2d 403, 406 (1973). This means that the insurance company must defend the suit
whenever a plaintiff advances any theory with the possibility of recovery and which arguably
falls with the coverage provided, however remote the possibility of recovery. See United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139, 1151 (W.D. Mich. 1988);
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duty to defend the insured, even when a pollution exclusion clause is
present, until it can be determined whether the release of pollution
was excluded from coverage."6 9 The duty to defend, however, is not
170
triggered until a suit has been brought against the insured.
2. Environmental Impairment Liability Insurance.- The uncertainty of coverage under a CGL policy' 7 1 may lead lenders to require
borrowers who are at a high risk for hazardous substance releases to
look to other forms of insurance. One special form of insurance is
Environmental Impairment Liability (EIL) insurance, which would
indemnify the insured from losses even if damages were not sudden
and accidental. 72 It is designed to cover third party damages caused
by pollution on a "claim-made" basis.'7
Detrex Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 681 F. Supp. 438, 443 (N.D. Ohio
1988).
169. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 76 (E.D. Mich.
1987). In determining the issue, "the burden is on the insurer to establish that some provision
of the applicable policy excludes coverage under the facts as taken in the light most favorable
to the insured." Rothenberg, supra note 163, at 89. Most jurisdictions use the "comparison
test" to determine whether a duty to defend exists. This "involves a side by side comparison of
the provisions of the policy with the allegations contained in the complaint." Del Tufo &
Rohn, Environmental Liabilitiesand Insurance Coverage Issues: An Overview, in IPl'ACr ON
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: 1988, supra note 44, at 561, 605.
170. See, e.g., City of Evart v. Home Ins. Co, No. 86-00419-ck (Mich Cir. Ct. Mar. 3,
1987) (granting summary judgment in favor of the insurer where the court held that there was
no duty to defend before a suit is pending against the insured); Technicon Elec. Corp. v.
American Home Assurance Co., 141 A.D.2d 124, 145, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91, 104 (1988) (holding
that the "letter sent by the EPA ... does not constitute institution of a 'suit' to recover such
damages as that term is used in the subject policies so as to require a defense." (citations
omitted)); cf. Detrex Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wassau, 681 F. Supp. 438, 442
(N.D. Ohio 1987) (ruling that there was no duty to defend since insuring language clearly
differentiated between claims against the insured and suits against the insured). But see ExCell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. at 75 (holding that the duty to defend is triggered prior to the
bringing of a traditional lawsuit). The court in Ex-Cell-O held that "'suit' includes any effort
to impose on the policyholders a liability ultimately enforceable by a court." Id.
171. Pollution liability was eliminated from virtually all CGL policies in 1986 and a new
CGL policy was adopted by many companies which excluded from coverage both sudden and
gradual pollution liability. Rodburg & Chesler, Beyond the Pollution Exclusion Clause:
Emerging Parameters of Insurance Coverage for Hazardous Site Liability, 1986 CHEII.
WASTE LITIG. REP. 324.

172. National Grange Mutual Ins. Co., 650 F. Supp. at 1404. EIL policies were intended to fill the gap created by the exclusion of coverage under CGL policies. See Telego,
Environmental Impairment Liability (EIL) Insurance: Current Trends in the Marketplace:
Future Trends and Impact of Government Action, 1985 LITIGATION/LIABILITY 383, 385.
"[T]he need for pollution insurance has led to the development of a claims-made, nonsudden,
gradual pollution damage policy. . . . [T]he EIL offers limited protection at high premiums
and essentially covers remediation costs incurred with the carrier's consent to reduce loss or to
protect the property of a third party." Del Tufo & Rohn, supra note 169, at 624-25.
173. Standards Applicable to Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment,
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The market for EIL has been growing 74 but this form of insurance has also been plagued with unanticipated underwriting losses,
ambiguous determinants of environmental risks and fears of further
changes in environmental laws which could undermine the premises
used in developing the policies. 7 5 While the number of carriers offering EIL coverage has decreased considerably, the premiums have
increased by more than two hundred percent.76 Although the future
for EIL may appear questionable, insurance companies are apt to
develop viable means of insuring the high risk group since the demand for coverage is increasing. Some experts and commentators believe that hazardous waste facilities will still be able to obtain insurance coverage even with the increased risk of large claims for the
insurers. 177 As market demand grows, competition for that market
will also increase, leading to a revitalization of EIL or similar
insurance. 78
3. Self Insurance.- The use of self insurance has begun
Storage, and Disposal Facilities: Liability Coverage, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,902, 33,904 (1985)
[hereinafter Standards]. A "claim-made" basis means that the policy pays based on the individual claim and the requirements for that claim, rather than a set amount for particular types
of claims which often have caps that are lower than the needed funds. Id. See generally T.
MALLIN, POLLUTION AND CONTAMINATION:

How

WILL PROPERTY INSURER'S RESPOND?

1

(1987).
174. Standards, supra note 173, at 33,904-05 (setting forth findings by the EPA).
175. Id. (discussing EPA findings regarding the conditions of the market for pollution
liability insurance).
176. Note, The Pollution Liability Insurance "Crisis'" Development of a Problem-Suggestionsfor a Solution, 15 CAP. U.L. REV. 677 (1986) (authored by Jerri Hougland Stewart).
It has been estimated that:
The number of insurance carriers offering EIL coverage decreased from thirteen in
1983 to three in 1985 and premiums increased 50 percent to 200 percent during
that same period. It has been predicted that the already meager EIL market, which
currently provides only about 5 percent of the demand for pollution liability coverage, will deteriorate further in the next few years.
Id. (citation omitted).
177. See Finlayson, EIL Market Could Rebound, Panelists Say, Bus. Ins., Apr. 29,
1985, at 44, col. 1,col. 4 (setting forth the belief that the constriction of pollution insurance
markets is short lived); Note, EncouragingSafety Through Insurance-Based Incentives: Financial Responsibilityfor Hazardous Wastes, 96 YALE L.J. 403, 422-23 (1986) (authored by
Jeffrey Kehne).
178. Finlayson, supra note 177, at 44. At least one commentator has made the following
observation:
In the absence of any indication that insurers regularly overestimate risks (a phenomenon that would be unlikely to persist in a competitive market for risks), there
is no basis for projecting that hazardous waste facilities subject to stringent financial
responsibility requirements would be unable to obtain coverage on terms that assign
appropriate prices to the risks that these facilities create.
Note, supra note 177, at 423.
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through "Risk Retention Groups."' 9 These groups assume and
spread the risk of CERCLA liability over all its members of the
group thereby permitting high risk industries to insure themselves
against hazardous waste contamination.18 0 Self insurance is provided
for under SARA 1 ' and gives a qualified preemption of state laws
prohibiting this type of insurance.1 2 Self insurance may alleviate the
problems arising out of the insurance industry's reluctance to insure
companies with a high risk of toxic contamination.18 3 There is concern, nonetheless, that the opportunity for corruption exists within
the groups. If the groups are not strictly regulated, risk retention
groups could become severely undersecured, since one substantial
claim could lead to the insolvency of the entire group.184 Although,
the effect or feasibility of self insurance is not yet known, if properly
managed, these groups could prove to be a viable alternative for insuring property that was previously believed to be virtually
uninsurable.
4. General Considerations.- There are many uncertainties concerning the viability of insuring against CERCLA liability. 85 Consequently, lenders must be aware of these limitations. Although a
lender may think that an investment was safe because the lender
required insurance, with different types of insurance and the varying
interpretations of coverage, the actual protection for a lender is uncertain. In addition, a determination that coverage exists may only
come after an extensive court proceeding which may tie up the insur179. SARA § 171 defines a "risk retention group" as "any corporation ...

whose pri-

mary activity consists of assuming and spreading all, or any portion, of the pollution liability of

its group members ...." SARA § 171, 42 U.S.C. § 9671(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
180.

See 42 U.S.C. § 9671 (Supp. IV 1986) (explaining that high risk industries will be

eligible for risk retention groups under SARA).
181. Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 210(a), 100 Stat. 1716 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9671
(Supp. IV 1986)).
182. SARA § 173, 42 U.S.C. § 9673 (Supp. IV 1986).
183. See Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 942, 948 (1988).
184. See Insurance Issues and Superfund: Hearings on S. 321-24 Before the Senate
Comm. on Envtl. and Pub. Works, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1985).
185. See Abraham, supra note 183, at 942; Bauer & Lakind, Toward Resolution of
Insurance Coverage Questions in Toxic Tort Litigation, 38 RUTGERS L. REv. 677 (1986);
Note, Insurers' Liability Under CERCLA: Shifting Hazardous Waste Site Cleanup Costs to
the InsuranceIndustry, 31 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 259 (1987) (authored by Joan Wart Gilles-

pie); see also supra notes 152-70 and accompanying text (discussing benefits to and problems
with CGL policies); supra notes 171-78 and accompanying text (discussing benefits to and

problems with EIL policies); supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text (discussing possible
uses of and problems with risk retention groups).
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ance proceeds for a considerable length of time.
Furthermore, the lender is, to some extent, at the mercy of the
borrower. The lender could lose its rights to the insurance proceeds if
the policy did not cover the activity which caused the hazard. Although the lender might have a claim against the borrower, the borrower is likely to be insolvent at that point. Moreover, the property
in which the lender has a security interest would be almost valueless
because of the hazardous waste.'86
Prudent lending would require a lender to insist on hazard insurance. The lender, however, must additionally evaluate the policy
to determine its terms and become familiar with the insurance laws
of the jurisdiction-especially the judicial interpretation of the insurance policies and legislation. 87 Further, the lender must evaluate
which type of insurance is best suited for the type of plant being
financed.' 88 One possibility is to first require an initial environmental
audit 89 and then, based on the evaluation of the audit, a more
knowledgeable decision can be made to determine the type of insurance required.
C. Warranties and Representations
Through a contractual agreement, a party may be released from
liability for cleanup costs.' 90 Indemnification agreements for environmental liability have generally been held to be valid contractual relationships between private parties.' The lender may include a warranty by the borrower in the security agreement that the property is
free of hazardous materials and the mortgaged property will not be
used for the manufacture, transportation, disposal or processing of
hazardous materials, except in compliance with federal, state and lo186. The lender may choose not to foreclose in the situation where there is a known
contaminant on the premises because of the potential liability under United States v. Mary-

land Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text (discussing this potential liability).
187.

See supra notes 157-84 and accompanying text.

188. See supra notes 152-84 and accompanying text (discussing the availability and limitations of CGL insurance, Environmental Impairment Liability insurance, and self insurance).
189. See supra notes 91-149 and accompanying text.
190. See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
that state law should govern the validity of cost recovery claims under CERCLA).
191. See, e.g., Marmon Group, Inc. v. Rexnord, Inc., 822 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1987); Caldwell v. Gurley Ref. Co., 755 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1985); Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc.,

696 F. Supp. 994 (D.N.J. 1988); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Armstrong World
Indus. Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1987); FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F.

Supp. 1285 (D. Minn. 1987).
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cal laws.1"2 The lender could require indemnification against environmental claims or liabilities arising out of the condition or use of the
property regardless of fault, date of claim, type of damage, or
amount of damage.193
There are severe limitations on the effectiveness of warranties
and indemnifications. A major problem with a warranty is that it is
only meaningful if the party who signs it can effectively be held to
its provisions. Unfortunately, by the time a lender would need to sue
on the warranty, the borrower is likely to be judgment proof due to
insolvency. Moreover, the lender may not want to foreclose on the
property because it has been contaminated.194 If properly drafted, an
indemnification might protect the lender from liability even if the
property is foreclosed because of the "innocent landowner" exception
from liability. 95 The third party defense, however, may not be applicable since there is a contractual relationship between the liable
party, the foreclosed borrower, and the lender/landowner.1 96
Probably the most effective use of warranties are for businesses
not currently using hazardous materials. The lender may preclude
192. Some representations and warranties which could be required include:
(1) representation of the existence of all required permits and licenses;

(2) compliance with all environmental laws, rules and regulations;
(3) absence of pending claims, lawsuits and administrative proceedings, or in-

vestigations pertaining to environmental compliance;
(4) accuracy of books and records supplied as part of an environmental
investigation;

(5) notice of any judicial or administrative proceeding into environmental
compliance;

(6) notification of the existence of any hazardous substance located at or in the
premises;
(7) knowledge of changes or events which will substantially alter the borrower's
ability to comply with environmental laws or the ability to obtain necessary permits.
Cf. Smith, Environmental Considerationsin Project Financing,in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, PROJECT FINANCING 1987: POWER GENERATION, WASTE RECOVERY, AND OTHER INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES 795, 856 (discussing warranties and representations from a seller prior to

the transaction).
193.

Representations and warranties may be very effective in a real estate transaction

between a seller and a buyer. For a general discussion of warranties in real estate transactions,
the impact SARA has had on contractual relationships, and examples of warranties which
could be used, see Chesler, supra note 148, at 311.

194. See supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text (discussing the risk of liability under
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986), for lenders

who do not sell foreclosed property immediately).
195.

See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text (discussing the "innocent land-

owner" exception).
196.

SARA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982), specifically excludes the "in-

nocent owner" defense when there is a contractual relationship with a liable party. See supra
notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
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the business from engaging in activity which has potential CERCLA
response repercussions and make this action a ground for default.
Here the target group is not the high environmental risk borrower,
but, rather the ordinary company which may regulate its own behavior if it knows that its loan will go into default if it engages in activity which involves the disposal of hazardous waste. The problem is
that the borrower may not be aware that its activities could lead to
improper disposal of hazardous waste.
D.

Affirmative Title Insurance

The American Land Title Association has begun offering a special rider to the lender's title insurance policy insuring against any
federal environmental protection liens and any state environmental
protection liens 197 which, at the date of the policy, are part of the
public records.' 98 In addition, most title companies are requiring precautionary soil tests to determine the possible presence of toxic material as a precautionary measure and in light of the broad definition
197. The endorsement would state the following:
The Company insures the insured against loss or damage sustained by reason of
lack of priority of the lien of the insured mortgage over:
(a) any environmental protection lien which, at Date of Policy, is recorded in those
records established under state statutes at date of Policy for the purpose of imparting constructive notice of matters relating to real property to purchasers for
value and without knowledge or filed in the records of the Clerk of the United
States District Court for the district in which the land is located, except as set forth
in schedule B; or
(b) any environmental protection lien provided for by any state statute in effect at
Date of Policy, except environmental protection liens provided for [in the state statutes listed below] ....
American Land Title Association (ALTA) form 8.1, Environmental Protection Lien Endorsement (rev. June 1, 1987).
198. Id. Public records are defined as:
[R]ecords established under state statutes at Date of Policy for the purpose of
imparting constructive notice of matters relating to real property to purchasers for
value and without knowledge .... [P]ublic records" shall also include [for the purpose of this exclusion from coverage] environmental protection liens filed in the
records of the clerk of the United States district court for the district in which the
land is located.
Id.
It should be noted that the EPA's National Priority List and state lists of incentive hazardous waste sites are not within the stated definition of "public record." In Hahn v. Alaska
Title Guar. Co., publication of a notice in the Federal Register was held to be in the "public
record." 557 P.2d 143, 145-46 (Alaska 1976). The definition in ALTA form 8.1, supra, of
"public record" is designed to avoid the result in Hahn. Rifkin, Environmental Coverage
(Hazardous Waste): The 1987 ALTA/1970 Policy, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, TITLE INSURANCE 1988: COMPARING THE 1987 AND THE 1970 ALTA POLICIES 285, 288 (1988).
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of public records. 9
A Connecticut court has ruled that since title insurance is a single liability insurance (protecting only one hazard), it is limited to
protection against loss due to defects or encumbrances of title which

exist at the time the policy is issued.200 Therefore, title insurance
may only provide indemnity for losses due to past occurrences rather
than for unforeseen future losses. 01 Under this analysis, response
costs not existing at the time the title insurance is issued would not
be covered under the policy.
Moreover, the title company would not be liable for a lien which
is not filed prior to the effective date of the policy, even if the lien is
present at the time of policy issuance. 02 The title company may,
however, be required to indemnify the insurer/lender if the title
company had reason to know about the lien. 0 3

The lender should not rely on title insurance as a viable means
of protection against liability for hazardous waste in light of the
above shortcomings. Although it can protect the lender to the extent
that the lender is assured there are no liens filed at the time the
mortgage is executed, it cannot assure against subsequently filed

liens. It should also be noted that, unfortunately for lenders, most
liens do not appear until after the issuance of a policy thereby severely limiting the effectiveness of title insurance as a viable means
199. Beasley, Hazardous Waste, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, TITLE INSURANCE
1987: THE NEW POLICY FORMS 529, 532-33 (1987).
200. In re Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., No. RD 86-22 (Conn. Ins. Dep't 1987), reprinted in
Beasley, supra note 199, at 537, 553.
201.

Id.at 543.

202. South Shore Bank v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 688 F. Supp. 803, 805 (D. Mass.
1988); cf. Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Kumar, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 53, 506 N.E.2d 154 (1987)
(holding that a purchaser cannot be indemnified by the title insurance company for an unfiled
lien, even if it was a valid lien which the seller knew existed at the time of the transfer of
title); see also In re Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., No. RD 86-22 (Conn. Ins. Dep't 1987), reprinted in Beasley, supra note 199, at 537, 550 (holding that insuring against the existence of
encumbrances of record whether in the land records or in the records at the state EPA would
be "a risk of future loss created by the potential subordination of the lender's mortgage to the
environmental lien of the State ... [which] would constitute an impermissible assumption of
casualty risk, outside the lawful business of title insurance.").
203. For example, if the seller reveals to the title company the possible existence of a
problem on the premises with improper disposal of hazardous products, the title company may
then be liable because they were made aware of the potential of a lien on the premises. See,
e.g., Note, Hidden Hazards of Hazardous Waste Cleanup Laws: Lenders & Title Insurers
Beware, 18 CUMB. L. REV. 723, 739-40 (1988) (authored by Virginia L. Martin) (discussing
potential liability of title insurers).
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of protection and producing a false sense of security on the part of
the lender.204
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although none of these prophylactic measures alone is sufficient

to protect a lender from CERCLA liability, using two or more of
these measures in conjunction may sufficiently minimize the lender's
risk of future liability. The level of scrutiny given to a loan with
regard to the potential for hazardous waste liability and the amount
of additional interest, if any, the lender requires in protecting against
environmental liability, will depend on the particular loan and the
collateral being used to secure the loan. In the situation where a
borrower is not directly involved with businesses which use or produce hazardous materials, it may be sufficient to require warranties
and possibly an initial pre-loan audit to determine if the property has
existing problems of which the borrower may not be aware. On the
other hand, a business which regularly uses, transports or disposes of
hazardous materials would require much more careful scrutiny, and
accordingly, some borrowers may be characterized as too great a risk
for the lender to enter into any security arrangement.
A lender might require (1) affirmative title insurance, 05 (2)
warranties, 0 6 (3) special hazardous waste insurance such as EIL, 0 7
or if that is not available, self insurance through membership in a
risk retention group, 208 and (4) environmental auditing, including
pre-loan auditing, periodic auditing during the life of the loan, and
an audit before the lender takes any action to foreclose on the property. 209 These protective mechanisms will reduce, but not eliminate,
the risk of liability for lenders arising from the release of hazardous
materials into the environment.
Laura E. Peck
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200-02 and accompanying text.
197-203 and accompanying text.
190-96 and accompanying text.
171-78 and accompanying text.
179-84 and accompanying text.
90-149 and accompanying text.
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